Four tables, a fireplace, a Louis Vuitton bag, and a black Mercedes. It sounds like the setup for a Netflix drama. But this is real life in Karlovy Vary, Czech Republic, where khachapuri is on the menu and Kremlin interests might be hidden behind a pink curtain.
Welcome to Pirosmani, a Georgian restaurant so small it could fit in a family living room. But don’t let the homey setting fool you. What looks like a cozy cultural escape may, in fact, be a node in a much larger network of influence, money laundering, and soft espionage, an old story wearing new clothes, played out under EU noses.
At the center of this tangled tale is Asmat Shanava, entrepreneur, networker, and alleged fixer. The restaurant walls scream “well-connected” with her grinning alongside Václav Klaus and other notable figures. But it’s her unofficial connections that raise the risk flags high above the EU’s already-blinking dashboard.
Let’s break it down.
From Borscht to Bank Transfers: What’s Cooking at Pirosmani?
Shanava’s restaurant isn’t just serving dumplings and red wine. According to Czech records, at least three individuals tied to the Russian criminal underworld have registered companies at that same address. This is not a coincidence. It’s a pattern and patterns matter in compliance.
Let’s name names:
- David Gvadzhaya: Self-declared vor v zakone (“thief in law”), convicted of extortion after threatening someone's children at a Prague hotel.
- Artem Demurov: Soviet-era convict and another alleged vor, with roots going back to Georgia’s shadowy past.
- Levan Dzhangveladze: Brother to a convicted mafia boss in Italy, financial handler for the family business, gunned down in Tbilisi in 2024.
These aren’t street-level thugs. These are part of a caste-like structure embedded in post-Soviet organized crime, known for money movement, muscle, and manipulation.
And yet... all three had companies registered at the same four-table Georgian restaurant.
Coincidence? Or convenience?
Enter Pravfond: Russia’s Wallet with a Mission
On paper, Pravfond is a foundation defending the rights of Russian compatriots abroad. In practice, it acts as a Kremlin proxy for legal warfare, narrative shaping, and disinformation laundering, especially when the usual diplomatic pipelines are blocked by EU sanctions.
In leaked internal emails, Shanava appears as a go-between, channeling funds to Czech lawyers defending:
- Alexander Franchetti, pro-Russian paramilitary organizer in Crimea
- Yevgeniy Nikulin, Russian hacker behind massive breaches including LinkedIn and Dropbox
When Russian money couldn’t flow directly due to sanctions, guess what? Shanava allegedly received the rubles in her Russian bank account and paid local Czech bills on Pravfond’s behalf. All wrapped up with a Georgian bow and served in a Czech border town.
The Compliance Abyss: Why This Isn’t Just “Interesting”
For the average EU microenterprise owner, this might seem like geopolitical theater far from their financial statements. But here’s the wake-up call:
Sanction evasion, disinformation, and organized crime do not always need guns or spies—they need gaps in governance.
And restaurants, shell companies, or proxy bank accounts offer fertile ground when no one’s watching.
At Xtroverso and under the ZENTRIQ™ framework, we don’t treat this as tabloid drama. We treat it as a signal.
When we investigate clients or counterparties for our Dutch microenterprise network, we look for just these patterns:
- Multi-entity registrations at single addresses
- Undisclosed connections to sanctioned entities
- “Invisible” financial facilitators posing as entrepreneurs
- Behavioral anomalies inconsistent with business purpose
We see them in import/export companies. In tech startups. In shell holding firms with Dutch KvK numbers and zero traceable activity. What happened at Pirosmani could very well happen in a vacant office in Rotterdam or an empty BV in Utrecht.
Silence is Not a Defense
When confronted, Shanava said nothing. Her lawyer was “on sick leave.” Pravfond, as expected, gave no response. Silence has become the default PR strategy of shadow networks.
But governance isn’t built on silence.
For Dutch micro and small enterprise CEOs reading this: you don’t need to become spies to stay safe. But you must stop being blind.
If a supplier, lawyer, investor, or “friendly advisor” shows up with vague Russian roots, an offshore account, and an offer to “arrange things,”, don’t nod. Investigate.
Use the tools. Ask for a ZENTRIQ™ audit. Check cross-registrations. Validate beneficial owners. Look for smoke before the fire burns your books.
The Bottom Line
What does a small Georgian restaurant in the Czech Republic have to do with your Dutch business?
Everything.
Because where governance is weak, risk doesn’t knock politely—it walks right in, orders dinner, and registers a company in your name.
Stay alert. Ask the hard questions.
And never assume four tables means small risks.
Karlovy Vary might serve soup with a side of scandal. But in the Netherlands, we prefer our dumplings clean and our balance sheets cleaner.